000			01593pab a2200157 454500
008			180718b2016 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aSchuster, Christian
245			_aWhat causes patronage reform: it depends on the type of civil service reform
260			_c2016
300			_ap.1094-1104.
520			_aPublic employment in most developing countries is governed by political patronage. Patronage provides many incumbents with governability and electoral advantage. What causes governments to forsake patronage in favour of civil service reform? This article reviews scholarly explanations. It finds that studies usefully identify diverse socioeconomic and political-institutional factors which can affect reform incentives. The causal effects of these factors ﾖ their weight, mechanisms and signs ﾖ are contested, however. This article partially resolves this contestation by considering which reform studies explain: different bureaucratic structures develop asynchronously and feature different determinants. To illustrate, political competition is argued to incentivize reform to 'blanket in' party appointees; or do the opposite by reducing expectations to reap longer-term state capacity benefits. Yet, 'blanketing in' necessitates bureaucratic job stability, while state capacity requires merit recruitment of skilled bureaucrats ﾖ two poorly correlated reforms. The causes of patronage reform thus depend on the type of civil service reform. - Repro
650			_aCivil service
650			_aAdministrative reform
773			_aPublic Administration
909			_a113886
999			_c113880 _d113880