000			01409pab a2200145 454500
008			180718b2017 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aMiller, Susan M.
245			_aHow electoral incentives shape performance measurement efforts
260			_c2017
300			_ap.623-637.
520			_aAlthough scholars have assessed how the electoral connection of legislators and chief executives affects their support for performance measurement, we know less about how electoral considerations might influence agency administrators' focus on performance measurement. I suggest that independently elected administrators' attention to their agency's performance measurement system may be conditional on the likelihood that their efforts in this area will help them realize their electoral goals. Because there is a greater electoral incentive to focus on performance issues when government performance is deficient, elected administrators should be as likely as, if not more likely than, their non-elected counterparts to focus on performance measurement when the government is performing poorly and less likely to do so when the government is performing well. I find evidence that supports this expectation. This article provides insight into the implications of electoral incentives for management decisions. - Reproduced.
650			_aPerformance appraisal
773			_aPublic Administration
909			_a116286
999			_c116280 _d116280