000			01302pab a2200205 454500
008			180718b2017 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLiu, Cheol
245			_aCorruption and state and local government debt expansion
260			_c2017
300			_ap.681-690.
362			_aSep-Oct
520			_aTheories describing rent seeking in the public sector posit a number of negative fiscal outcomes that the choices of corrupt officials may generate. The evidence presented in this article shows that states with greater intensities of public corruption have higher aggregate levels of state and local debt. If corruption in the 10 most corrupt states were only at an average level, their public debt would be 9 percent lower, or about $249.35 per capita, all else being equal. Notably, institutional control measures may not have succeeded in restraining the expansion of state and local public debt in the presence of greater levels of corruption. State and local governments would achieve more efficient levels of fiscal discipline by curbing public sector corruption. - Reproduced.
650			_aDebts
650			_aLocal government
650			_aCorruption
700			_aMikesell, John L.
700			_aMoldogaziev, Tima T.
773			_aPublic Administration Review
909			_a116488
999			_c116482 _d116482