000			02092pab a2200205 454500
008			180718b2018 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aAshok Pankaj
245			_aDiscretionary powers of Governor- III: an interpretation from federal perspective
260			_c2018
300			_ap.49-72.
362			_aMar
520			_aThis article examines the scope of discretionary powers of governor of a state in India from federal perspective and argues that they are against the principle of ﾑcabinet responsibilityﾒ, an essential feature of parliamentary form of government that India intertwined with the federal constitution. These apparent anachronistic constitutional provisions were inherited from the Government of India Act, 1935, and retained with some modifications in the Constitution of Independent India as an institutional safeguard for the unity and integrity of Union of India that was formed by the merger of more than 500 princely states and a number of British administered provinces. As against the intentions of the constitution makers, the use of discretionary powers by governors has remained short of constitutional propriety, and it has been a major source of tension in centreﾖstate relations. This has been partly because of the scope of powers itself and partly because of political factors. This article adds to various attempts of defining the scope of discretionary powers of the governor. A governor, appointed on political considerations, flippantly sets aside norms, values and constitutional propriety, expected of him in exercise of his/her powers. The lack of tenurial security makes him susceptible to the pressure of the union government. Only through political consensus, a solution can be found out to resolve this tricky issue of Indian federalism. - Repro
650			_aCentre-state relations - India
650			_aFederalism - India
650			_aDiscretionary power - India
650			_aGovernors - Powers and functions - India
650			_aGovernors - India
773			_aIndian Journal of Public Administration
909			_a116529
999			_c116523 _d116523