000			01445pab a2200205 454500
008			180718b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aMelville, Abigail
245			_aPower, strategy and games _beconomic regulation of a privatized utility.
300			_ap.129-55
362			_aApr 94-Mar 95
520			_a"This article rejects conventional `rational actor' models of economic regulation in favour of a focus on processes of resource exchange and dependence. Using a case study of Yorkshire Water it identifies the membership and structure of the regulatory arena, the resources available to regulatory actors, the `rules of the game', and the strategies adopted by regulator and regulated. It highlights the structurally privileged position of investors in water regulation and concludes that decision-making excludes customer interests; decisions are made by professional actors on the basis of co-operation and consensus; the regulator is relatively weak and depends on companies compliance to maintain its own legitimacy; and large companies have a great range of strategic options in pursuit of regulatory advantage"
650			_aPublic utilities - Great Britain
650			_aRegional water and sewage companies
650			_aWater authority
650			_aPublic policy - Great Britain
650			_aPrivatization - Great Britain
650			_aWater supply - Great Britain
773			_aManagement in Government
909			_a29936
999			_c29936 _d29936