000			02035pab a2200181 454500
008			180718b1997 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aJoyce, Philip G.
245			_aThe federal line-item veto: what is it and what will it do?
260			_c1997
300			_ap.95-104
362			_aMar-Apr
520			_aThe Line Item Veto Act (P.L.104-130), which took effect on January 1, 1997, could have profound effects on the relationship between Congress and the president in the budget process. Rather than providing constitutional item-veto authority similar to that enjoyed by governors, this version of the item veto is an expansion of the president's authority to rescind appropriated funds, first created by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Under P.L. 104-130, the president's proposed cancellations of discretionary budget authority, new direct spending, and targeted tax benefits will take effect unless specifically disapproved by Congress. As enacted, the line-item veto will have effects that are far less dramatic than most of its supporters or detractors have suggested. It is likely to have little effect on overall spending and deficits. It could increase the president's ability to persuade members of Congress to support his priorities in exchange for a promise not to use this new power to cut out items that these members support. The structure of the Line Item Veto Act may allow the Congress, however, to circumscribe the president's power by changing the way that legislation is packaged or by writing specific language into legislation that restricts its use. Scholars should examine and evaluate these and other effects of P.L.104-130 because the law sunsets on January 1, 2005, thus forcing a decision concerning whether the president should continue to have this authority and in what form. - Reproduced
650			_aPresidents - United States
650			_aPolitics and government
700			_aReischauer, Robert D.
773			_aPublic Administration Review
909			_a33873
999			_c33873 _d33873