000			01132pab a2200169 454500
008			180718b1998 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBhaumik, Sumon
245			_aInvestment, incentive and credit: does the government matter?
260			_c1998
300			_ap.263-75
362			_aJul-Dec
520			_aThe literature on banking and credit has, among other things, focused on credit allocations made by banks in the presence of asymmetric information and the resultant moral hazard and adverse selection problems. However, it is not obvious that in a free market with no information-related problems and uncertainly, net-revenue-maximizing banks will have zero excess reserves in equilibrium and/or provide credit to a large number of projects. The paper shows that the government might be able to affect both the size and the distribution of credit disbursals with the help of tax cuts. It also charts out a case in favour of closer bank-firm relationship as in the classical German-Japanese paradigm. - Reproduced
650			_aBanks
700			_aSrinivasan, Rajesh
773			_aManagement and Change
909			_a39819
999			_c39819 _d39819