000			01032pab a2200181 454500
008			180718b1999 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLindbeck, Assar
245			_aSocial norms and economic incentives in the welfare state
260			_c1999
300			_ap.1-35
362			_aFeb
520			_aThis paper analyzes the interplay between social norms and economic incentives in the context of work decisions in the modern welfare state. We assume that to live off one's own work is a social norm, and that the larger the population share adhering to this norm, the more intensely it is felt by the individual. Individuals face two choices: one economic, whether to work or live off public transfers; and one political, how large the transfer should be. The size of the transfer and the intensity of the social norm are determined endogenously in equilibrium. - Reproduced
650			_aSocial policy
700			_aWeibull, Jorgen W.
700			_aNyberg, Sten
773			_aQuarterly Journal of Economics
909			_a41164
999			_c41164 _d41164