000			01138pab a2200181 454500
008			180718b1999 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aMeier, Kenneth J.
245			_aPolitics, bureaucracy, and farm credit
260			_c1999
300			_ap.293-302
362			_aJul-Aug
520			_aThe most common view of political institutions and their control over bureaucracy is the principal-agent model. That model assumes that politicians and bureaucrats disagree over goals and the means to obtain those goals. It also assumes that bureaucrats have access to valuable information that politicians do not have. Agricultural credit is a policy area that does not fit these assumptions. In it we find a version of bottom-line oversight, whereby the agency has clear goals and political institutions (in this case Congress) act only when serious problems occur. This "smoke detector" form of oversight is confirmed with a time series analysis of agricultural credit outputs. - Reproduced
650			_aBureaucracy
700			_aWrinkle, Robert D.
700			_aPolinard, J.L.
773			_aPublic Administration Review
909			_a41935
999			_c41935 _d41935