000			01127pab a2200157 454500
008			180718b2000 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBenabou, Roland
245			_aUnequal societies: income distribution and the social contract
260			_c2000
300			_ap.96-129
362			_aMar
520			_aThis paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political "fundamentals" can sustain such different systems of social insurance, fiscal redistribution, and education finance as those of the United States and Western Europe. With imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare, and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality. Conversely, with credit constraints, lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality; hence the potential for multiple steady states, with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution, or vice versa. - Reproduced
650			_aIncome distribution
773			_aAmerican Economic Review
909			_a44583
999			_c44583 _d44583