000			01265pab a2200157 454500
008			180718b2001 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aKoppell, Jonathan G.S.
245			_aHybrid organizations and the alignment of interests: the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
260			_c2001
300			_ap.468-82
362			_aJul-Aug
520			_aThis article explores the political influence of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Using Congress's overhaul of the regulatory infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a case study, the article presents two principal findings: (1) The characteristics that distinguish government-sponsored enterprises from traditional government agencies and private companies endow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with unique political resources; and (2) the alignment of interest groups around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is subject to strategic manipulation by the GSEs. A triangular model of this alignment is proposed and employed to analyze the legislative outcome. The case has implications for students of organizational theory as well as policy makers considering the use of GSEs or other hybrid organizations. - Reproduced
650			_aPublic sector
773			_aPublic Administration Review
909			_a49753
999			_c49753 _d49753