000			01749nam a2200193Ia 4500
008			181130s2018 xx 000 0 und d
100			_aDohler, Marian
245			_aDiscovering the dark side of power: _bthe principal�s moral hazard in political-bureaucratic relations
260			_c2018
300			_ap.190-202.
504			_dFeb
520			_aPrincipal agent (PA) is among the most prominent concepts for analyzing the relationship between politics and bureaucracy. Nonethelesss, the inherent bias of PA scholars to attribute moral hazard almost exclusively to the agent, usually referred to as �bureaucratic drift�, requires re-examination. Building on the spare literature in which moral hazard of the principal is considered, this paper provides empirical evidence for a neglected aspect of the PA concept. Three cases of German regulatory agencies responsible for drug control, financial services and rail safety are analyzed in critical situations which were largely perceived as bureaucratic failures. The analysis reveals that a good deal of these failures, ranging from negligence to suppressing crucial information, has to be attributed to the political principal. This is called the dark side of power because the intention is to shift blame or to dodge political responsibility. Turning conventional PA reasoning upside down, the conclusion is that the principal�s moral hazard should be considered more routinely as a potential explanation for political-bureaucratic interactions. - Reproduced.
650			_aBureaucracy
650			_aCivil service
650			_aPolitics and administration
650			_aPolitics and government
773			_aInternational Journal of Public Administration
906			_aBureaucracy
999			_c506728 _d506728