000			01992nam a2200193Ia 4500
008			181130s2018 xx 000 0 und d
100			_aBuehler, Matt
245			_aThe autocrat's advisors: _bopening the black box of ruling coalitions in Tunisia's authoritarian regime
260			_c2018
300			_ap.330-346.
504			_dJun
520			_aWhy do autocrats retain some elites as core, long-term members of their ruling coalitions for years, while others are dismissed in months? How and why might the type of elites retained within coalitions vary across time and different autocrats? Although what constitutes an authoritarian regime�s ruling coalition varies across countries, often including the military and dominant parties, this article focuses on one critical subcomponent of it�an autocrat�s cabinet and his elite advisors within it, his ministers. Because coalitions function opaquely to prevent coups, scholars consider their inner-workings a black box. We shed light through an original, exhaustive dataset from the Middle East of all 212 ministers who advised Tunisian autocrats from independence until regime collapse (1956�2011). Extracting data from Arabic sources in Tunisian national archives, we track variation in minister retention to identify which elites autocrats made core, long-term advisors within ruling coalitions. Whereas Tunisia�s first autocrat retained elites as ministers due to biographical similarities, capacity to represent influential social groups, and competence, its second autocrat did not. He became more likely to dismiss types of elites retained under the first autocrat, purging his coalition of ministers perceived to be potential insider-threats due to their favored status under his predecessor. - Reproduced.
650			_a Autocratic coalitions
650			_aAuthoritarianism
650			_aCoalitions - Tunisia
700			_aAyari, Mehdi
773			_aPolitical Research Quarterly
906			_aCoalitions - Tunisia
999			_c506826 _d506826