000			01691nam a2200181Ia 4500
008			181130s2018 xx 000 0 und d
100			_aJansa, Joshua M.
245			_aDo unions punish democrats?: _bfree-trade votes and labor PAC contributions, 1999-2012
260			_c2018
300			_ap.424-439.
504			_dJun
520			_aThis article examines whether labor unions punish incumbent Democrats who vote for free-trade bills in Congress. We theorize that punishment is a risky strategy for interest groups that prefer one party over the other. Therefore, interest groups must be substantially affected by decline in party support to punish. Consistent with our theory, we find important differences between public- and private-sector unions in their willingness to punish. Although public-sector unions articulate opposition to free trade, they do not follow through with either deterrence (withholding contributions to send a signal) or incapacitation (withholding contributions to replace the wayward candidate with a more supportive one). Private-sector unions, specifically unions that organize trade-vulnerable industrial workers, do attempt to punish Democrats via deterrence. The estimated deterrence effect is a 6 percent reduction in contributions. This study improves on previous studies by modeling punishment across several congressional sessions and multiple trade votes. The results reveal new insights into labor�s approach to declining protectionism among congressional Democrats. - Reproduced.
650			_aInterest groups
650			_aLabour unions
700			_aHoyman, Michele M.
773			_aPolitical Research Quarterly
906			_aInterest groups
999			_c506832 _d506832