000			01566pab a2200181 454500
008			180718b2001 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aCortell, Andrew P.
245			_aLimiting the unintended consequences of institutional change
260			_c2001
300			_ap.768-99
362			_aSep
520			_aStudents of institutional change pay insufficient attention to the conditions under which institutional reform produces unintended procedural and policy consequences. The authors contend that the broader institutional context in which an altered institution is embedded influences the likelihood and extent of such unintended outcomes. Three aspects of this environment are particularly important. First, a reformer's access to policy instruments may allow him or her to monitor compliance and sanction noncompliance with the altered institution. Second, normative understandings can reinforce or work against specific institutional reforms. Finally, the organization of decision-making authority within the state determines the ability of state and societal actors to derail institutional change and its intended consequences. Two empirical investigations illustrate the argument: congressional attempts in the 1980s to limit executive authority over U.S. policy in Nicaragua and the institutional reforms Margaret Thatcher implemented to advance a market-oriented industrial strategy. - Reproduced
650			_aOrganizations
650			_aOrganizational change
700			_aPeterson, Susan
773			_aComparative Politics
909			_a50745
999			_c50745 _d50745