000			01284nam a22002057a 4500
999			_c507490 _d507490
008			190215b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aYamshchiko, Ivan P. _91802
245			_aGovernment and corruption: _bScylla and Charybdis
260			_c2018
300			_ap.880-887.
520			_aUsing public sector employment and corruption perception data for 72 countries across the world, this article demonstrates that despite common notion countries with “smaller” governments do not tend to have lower corruption. Under general assumptions, one can demonstrate that there is an optimal size of public sector employment corresponding to the highest capital intensity. The model has several implications: lower optimal sizes of governments for labor intensive countries and higher sizes for capital intensive ones, possibility to reduce corruption paying a cost of suboptimal output, and a higher “price” of an oversized government for labor intensive countries. - Reproduced.
650			_aBureaucracy _91803
650			_aPublic administration _91804
650			_aPublic sector _91805
700			_aDetkova, Aleksandra _91806
700			_aTikhonov, Alexey _91807
773			_aInternational Journal of Public Administration
906			_aCorruption
942			_2ddc _cAR