| 000 | 01261nam a2200169 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 999 |
_c508151 _d508151 |
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| 008 | 190313b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 |
_aSohn, Hosung _93259 |
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| 245 |
_aDo public employees "game" performance budgeting systems?" _bevidence from the program assessment rating tool in Korea |
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| 260 | _c2018 | ||
| 300 | _ap.458-475. | ||
| 520 | _aWe examine whether performance budgeting systems such as the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) induce public employees to engage in “gaming” behavior. We propose an algorithm for detecting gaming behavior that makes use of the discrete nature of the PART system in Korea (KPART) and the revealed patterns of the distribution of the KPART scores. By employing the test developed by McCrary, we find suspicious patterns in the density of the KPART scores and evidence points to the fact that manipulation is prevalent in the KPART system. Our analysis suggests that public employees are sensitive to negative incentives and that great care must be taken when designing performance budgeting systems. - Reproduced. | ||
| 650 |
_aPerformance budget - Korea _93260 |
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| 700 |
_aBae, Kwang Bin _93261 |
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| 773 | _aAmerican Review of Public Administration | ||
| 906 | _aBudget - Korea | ||
| 942 |
_2ddc _cAR |
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