000			01553nam a2200169 4500
999			_c509434 _d509434
008			190508b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHegele, Yvonne _95238
245			_aExplaining bureaucratic power in intergovernmental relations: A network approach
260			_c2018
300			_ap.753-768.
520			_aThe core assumption of the bureaucratic politics model and a large part of public administration scholarship is that bureaucrats influence politicians and political decisions via their crucial role in preparing, coordinating and formulating policy. While this influence has been analysed in a vertical direction, that is, how much do bureaucrats influence politicians, the horizontal perspective has been mostly neglected: which bureaucrats are most powerful and influential during the process of bureaucratic coordination and decision‐making? Deducing hypotheses from bargaining theory and testing them with a novel network dataset on German Intergovernmental Relations (IGR), this contribution finds that bureaucrats indeed possess varying degrees of power. Jurisdictional and organizational power resources, such as voting, financial and institutional power, and also party politics, can best explain these variances in bureaucratic power. Personal characteristics, such as experience and education, however, are not used as power resources. - Reproduced.
650			_aPublic administration _95239
650			_aBureaucracy _95240
773			_aPublic Administration
906			_aIntergovernmental relations
942			_2ddc _cAR