| 000 | 01512nam a2200169 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 999 |
_c509532 _d509532 |
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| 008 | 190513b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 |
_aBelle, Nicola _95485 |
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| 245 | _aProspect theory goes public: experimental evidence on cognitive biases in public policy and management decisions | ||
| 260 | _c2018 | ||
| 300 | _ap.828-840. | ||
| 520 | _aThis article tests a broad range of cognitive biases branching out from prospect theory in the context of public policy and management. Results illuminate systematic deviations from rationality. In experiments 1 through 5, the framing of outcomes influenced decisions across policy and management domains. In experiment 6, public employees were prone to an anchoring bias when setting standards for responsiveness. Experiment 7 shows that public workers tend to put more effort into activities that affect higher percentages of beneficiaries, even if the absolute number of affected clients is constant. Experiments 8 and 9 suggest that public employees are more likely to stick to a suboptimal status quo as the number of superior alternatives increases. Experiment 10 provides evidence of an asymmetric dominance effect: decisions changed when a decoy was present. This article contributes to behavioral public administration by replicating and extending previous trials. - Reproduced. | ||
| 650 |
_aPublic administration _95486 |
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| 700 |
_aBelardinelli, Paolo _95487 |
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| 773 | _aPublic Administration Review | ||
| 906 | _aPublic policy | ||
| 942 |
_2ddc _cAR |
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