000			01595nam a2200157 4500
999			_c509552 _d509552
008			190514b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aRottinghaus, Brandon _95532
245			_aThe cost of doing business: congressional requests, cost, and allocation of presidential resources
260			_c2018
300			_ap.813-825.
520			_aExecutive-legislative interactions operate with cost-benefit trade-offs. Presidents possess several material options in granting Congressional requests to leverage Congressional support but must also marshal these scarce resources. We argue presidents should strategically grant requests from members of Congress for a range of executive actions based upon the cost of the request and the political context. Using an original data set of nearly 4,000 internal Congressional requests made during the Eisenhower, Ford, and H. W. Bush administrations, we find that presidents are strategic in granting requests, where the cost of the request is an important consideration when deciding whether or not to approve a legislator request, especially on executive appointments but not on legislative matters. Ideological proximity to the president matters more than partisanship in granting requests. Presidents are sensitive to cost when ideology is concerned but less so when granting requests to committee chairs. We conclude by highlighting the implications for interbranch bargaining. - Reproduced.
700			_aWaggoner, Philip D. _95533
773			_aPolitical Research Quarterly
906			_aPolitics and government - United States
942			_2ddc _cAR