000			01152nam a22001697a 4500
999			_c509566 _d509566
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100			_aBerton, Raul Magni _95563
245			_aAlternation through death: Is gerontocracy an equilibrium?
260			_c2018
300			_ap.975-988.
520			_aAccording to minimalist theories of democracy, the reason why civil conflicts are less frequent in democracies is that opposition parties can reasonably expect to win the next elections: they then prefer to wait than to rebel. In dictatorships, waiting until the dictator dies is generally much costlier. This waiting time, however, is considerably shortened when the dictator is old. Therefore, the risk of domestic conflict should decrease along with the age of autocratic leaders. Based on 160 countries from 1960 to 2008, our empirical analysis shows that the leader’s age decreases the likelihood of violent rebellion in dictatorships, but not in democratic regimes. - Reproduced.
650			_aPolitical leadership _95564
700			_aPanel, Sophie _95565
773			_aPolitical Research Quarterly
906			_aDemocracy
942			_2ddc _cAR