000			01303nam a2200181 4500
999			_c510429 _d510429
008			190816b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aPark, Brandon Beomseob _98538
245			_aDo the welfare benefits weaken the economic vote? a cross-national analysis of the welfare state and economic wing
260			_c2019
300			_ap.108-125.
520			_aComparative economic voting studies have found great instability in economic voting across countries and over time. In explaining this instability, we highlight the role of welfare systems because strong welfare protection attenuates voters’ incentives to base their vote on government economic performance. By analyzing 174 legislature elections in 31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from 1980 to 2010 and by taking into account clarity of responsibility, we find that welfare protection weakens the linkage between macroeconomic outcomes and incumbent electoral fortunes. This result implies that strong welfare protection enables politicians to avoid blame for economic failures. - Reproduced.
650			_aSocial policy _98429
650			_aElections _98430
700			_aShin, Jungsub _98431
773			_aInternational Political Science Review
906			_aWelfare state
942			_2ddc _cAR