000			01660nam a2200169 4500
999			_c510430 _d510430
008			190816b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aAslam, Ghazia _98539
245			_aDecentralization reforms in dictatorial regimes as a survival strategy: evidence from Pakistan
260			_c2019
300			_ap.126-142.
520			_aAre decentralization reforms in dictatorial regimes mere window dressing or can they deliver longevity for dictators? Many scholars in political science have argued that seemingly democratic institutions established in dictatorships play a crucial role in increasing the survival potential of the authoritarian regime by providing a channel to the dictator to co-opt members of the opposition, identify their bases of support and recruit effective coalition members. While most of the existing analysis has focused on national elections and political parties, we use primary data and social network methodology to analyze the 2001 decentralization reforms established during General Musharraf’s military regime in Pakistan. We show that seemingly democratically empowering decentralized governance structures can also be used to distribute rents to political supporters through ostensibly legitimate channels. Therefore, this paper adds to the literature on institutions in dictatorships on two fronts in addition to providing crucial information about the political landscape in a strategically important country. - Reproduced.
650			_aDecentralization - Pakistan _98433
650			_aAuthoritarianism _98434
773			_aInternational Political Science Review
906			_aDictatorship - Pakistan
942			_2ddc _cAR