000			01582nam a2200181 4500
999			_c510443 _d510443
008			190817b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLiang, Jiaqi _98471
245			_aLinking anticorruption threats, performance pay, administrative outputs, and policy outcomes in China
260			_c2019
300			_ap.177-194.
520			_aLittle is known about the effects of two prominent public sector reforms—anticorruption efforts and high‐powered incentive systems—on the accomplishment of policy goals in the absence of the rule of law and in the presence of an extrinsic incentive to take advantage of corruption to achieve performance targets. This study explores how performance rewards and anticorruption efforts jointly affect administrative outputs and policy outcomes. We examine China's air pollution control policy with province‐level panel data. The analysis shows that performance rewards prompt administrative outputs that are linked to the incentive structure. Anticorruption activities have small significant, positive effects on those outputs only prior to the inception of high‐powered rewards, but have no significant effect on policy outcomes, regardless of the measure. The introduction of performance incentives contributes to the achievement of policy outcomes only when their measurement is subject to government manipulation. - Reproduced.
650			_aPublic sector reforms _98472
650			_aAir pollution _98473
700			_aLangbein, Laura _98474
773			_aPublic Administration
906			_aCorruption - China
942			_2ddc _cAR