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999			_c511405 _d511405
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100			_aGjerlow, Haakon _911084
245			_aTRENDS: Leaders, private interests, and socially wasteful projects: Skyscrapers in democracies and autocracies
260			_bPolitical Research Quarterly
300			_a72(2), Jun, 2019: p.504-520.
520			_aPolitical leaders often have private incentives to pursue socially wasteful projects, but not all leaders are able to pursue these interests. We argue that weaker accountability mechanisms allow autocratic leaders to more easily realize wasteful projects than democratic leaders. We focus on one particular project, skyscraper construction, where we obtain objective measures comparable across different contexts. We test different implications from our argument by drawing on a new dataset recording all buildings exceeding 150 m, globally. We find that autocracies systematically build more new skyscrapers than democracies. Furthermore, autocratic skyscrapers are more excessive than democratic ones, and—in contrast with democracies—autocracies pursue skyscraper projects to about the same extent in rural/poor and urban/rich societies. When investigating different mechanisms entailed in our argument, the link between regime type and skyscraper construction seems due in large part to stronger vertical accountability mechanisms and more open information environments in democracies. - Reproduced.
650			_aAutocracy _911085
650			_aAccountability _911086
700			_aKnutsen, Carl Henrik _911087
773			_aPolitical Research Quarterly
906			_aDemocracy
942			_2ddc _cAR