000			01478nam a2200169 4500
999			_c511728 _d511728
008			191006b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aGirth, Amanda M. _911962
245			_aContract design, complexity, and incentives: Evidence from U.S. federal agencies
260			_bAmerican Review of Public Administration
300			_a49(3), Apr, 2019: p.325-337.
520			_aFinancial incentives are used throughout the public and private sectors to control costs, expedite projects, maximize quality, and encourage performance. Although federal agencies in the United States utilize incentive contracts, there is little research on the scope of their use or effectiveness. This study analyzes nearly 390,000 federal contracts across service acquisitions of varying complexity to determine whether incentive contracts differ in contract duration, cost, or technical performance when compared with other types of contracts. The results indicate that contracts appear to execute differently on these three dimensions based on the complexity of the acquired service. The findings provide a heightened understanding of the accountability dynamics in third-party implementation, particularly when financial incentives are used to motivate contractor performance. - Reproduced.
650			_aGovernment contracting _911963
700			_aLopez Lauren E. _911964
773			_aAmerican Review of Public Administration
906			_aPublic contracts - United States
942			_2ddc _cAR