000			01767nam a2200169 4500
999			_c512254 _d512254
008			191115b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aNi, Xing _913288
245			_aInstitutional anticorruption in China: Effectiveness on bribery incidence
260			_bPublic Administration Review
300			_a79(4), Jul-Aug, 2019: p.538-551.
520			_aThis article investigates the effectiveness of anticorruption practices against bribery incidence, highlighting top‐down and bottom‐up approaches. A random survey of local residents is used in conjunction with institutional anticorruption indicators. Findings suggest that the top‐down approach works, but with substantial variation across practices. More intense top‐down anticorruption deters bribery incidence within citizens' dense networks, and more judicial convictions directly suppress citizens' bribery experience and willingness. The bottom‐up and combined approaches yield both deterrence and signaling effects, contingent on institutional parameters. More public whistle‐blowing deters citizens' bribery experience and willingness, yet, when coupled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, it signals severe government corruption and predicts more bribery incidence. On the contrary, more grievance filings predict more bribery incidence via signaling effects, but, when bundled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, they deter citizens' subsequent bribery experience and willingness. The article concludes with a discussion of the research findings and theoretical and practical implications. - Reproduced.
650			_aBribery _913289
700			_aSu, Xuhong (Su Su) _913290
773			_aPublic Administration Review
906			_aCorruption - China
942			_2ddc _cAR