000			01610nam a2200157 4500
999			_c512256 _d512256
008			191115b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aSilitongs, Mala Sondang et al _913293
245			_aSetting a good example??: the effect of leader and peer behavior on corruption among Indonesian senior civil servants
260			_bPublic Administration Review
300			_a79(4), Jul-Aug, 2019: p.565-579.
520			_aStandard anticorruption interventions consist of intensified monitoring and sanctioning. Rooted in principal‐agent theory, these interventions are based on the assumption that corrupt acts follow a rational cost‐benefit calculation by gain‐seeking individuals. Given their mixed results, however, these interventions require closer scrutiny. Building on goal‐framing theory, the authors argue that rule compliance requires a salient normative goal frame, since monitoring can never be perfect. Being inherently brittle, it needs constant reinforcement through external cues operating alongside formal monitoring and sanctioning. Leaders and peers setting a good example can provide such cues. In line with this hypothesis, analysis of multilevel repeated measures data from a vignette study of 580 Indonesian senior civil servants shows that the perceived likelihood of a hypothetical civil servant accepting a bribe is lowest when monitoring and sanctioning are strong and when leaders and peers are known to have refused bribes in the past. - Reproduced,
650			_aCorruption _913294
773			_aPublic Administration Review
906			_aCivil service
942			_2ddc _cAR