000			01577nam a2200169 4500
999			_c512440 _d512440
008			191122b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aKasdin, Stuart _913705
245			_aContracts, agency vulnerability, and the allocation of federal funds
260			_bAmerican Review of Public Administration
300			_a49(6), Aug, 2019: p.720-732.
520			_aLegislators have the potential for credit claiming from agency spending in a congressional district only when the awarded contracts or grants are sufficiently large to be noticed or appreciated. Therefore, unlike previous research on distributive politics, we examine the allocation of contracts considering the size of the contracts, not just the overall spending or the numbers of contracts per congressional district. We use a difference-in-difference analysis to evaluate how agencies altered their allocations of contracts in response to the 2006 congressional elections, in which partisan control of the Congress changed to the Democrats. We find that federal agencies responded to the election by allocating larger contracts to Democratic districts. In addition, we find that agencies whose programs received lower scores on the Bush administration’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) allocated larger contracts to Democratic than Republican districts than did agencies whose programs received higher PART ratings. - Reproduced.
650			_aContracts _913706
700			_aLin, Luona _913707
773			_aAmerican Review of Public Administration
906			_aGovernment purchase
942			_2ddc _cAR