000			01432nam a2200169 4500
999			_c512653 _d512653
008			191205b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHogenauer, Anna-Lena _914293
245			_aThe parliamentary scrutiny of euro area national central banks
260			_bPublic Administration
300			_a97(3), 2019: p.576-589.
520			_aEuropean Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) involves several core principles for the organization of participating national central banks (NCBs/CBs), including their independence from political institutions. Early studies show that the level of national parliamentary scrutiny over euro area NCBs varied (Lepper and Sterne 2002). In this context, our article examines the extent to which parliaments make use of four distinct control mechanisms to hold CBs accountable. We explain the very different levels of parliamentary scrutiny over NCBs in Germany, France and Belgium during the 2013–16 period. We find that the level of scrutiny depends principally on the presence of a longstanding tradition of CB independence—and specifically the manner in which independence has been politicized and interpreted by the political class. We argue that the strength of the parliament can also explain some variation. - Reproduced.
650			_aCentral banks _914294
700			_aHowarth, David _914295
773			_aPublic Administration
906			_aBanks and banking
942			_2ddc _cAR