000			01484pab a2200169 454500
008			180718b2001 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aTaylor, Brian D.
245			_aRussias' passive army: rethinking military coup.
260			_c2001
300			_ap.924-52
362			_aOct
520			_aMilitary coups are considered most likely when state political capacity is low and the army 's corporate interests are threatened. However, these conditions are also frequently present in situation in which the military remains politically passive, weakening the explanatory power of these propositions. In Russia, an extremely weak state coexists with an army whose corporate interests have been threatened over the past decade, yet the military has not intervened in high politics. Two alternative explanations for this behavior are examined, one based on internal cleavages in the army (organizational structure) and the second on officer corps norms (organizational culture). Although both accounts are plausible, organizational culture provides the best explanation for Russian military passivity. The importance of this variable is demonstrated in a study of Russian military behavior from 1992 to 1999. Studying nonevents, and moving beyond the coup/noncoup dichotomy, provides a more complete picture of military behavior in domestic politics. - Reproduced.
650			_aRussia. Army
650			_aArmed forces
773			_aComparative Political Studies
909			_a51296
999			_c51296 _d51296