000			01479nam a2200193 4500
999			_c512999 _d512999
008			200108b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aMartin, Isaac William _953178
245			_aPolicy design and the politics of city revenue: Evidence from California Municipal Ballot measures
260			_bUrban Affairs Review
300			_a55(5), Sep, 2019: p.1312-1338.
520			_aResidents of the United States rely on municipal governments to deliver important public goods but are often reluctant to pay for those goods. Can tax policy design affect voters’ propensity to say yes to local taxes? We answer this question by analyzing a new database of 929 tax increases of heterogeneous design that were proposed to California voters from 1996 to 2010. We find that voters’ willingness to raise a municipal tax varies with the choice of tax base, as well as with such policy design features as its timing and its symbolic links to particular purposes. The political limits on city revenue may vary substantially depending on how a tax is designed, and theories that assume otherwise—including several classic models of urban politics—may exaggerate the degree to which municipal revenues are constrained. - Reproduced.
650			_aTaxation _915207
650			_aMunicipal government - United States _915208
700			_aLopez, Jane Lilly _915209
700			_aOlsen, Lauren _915210
773			_aUrban Affairs Review
906			_aPolicy design
942			_2ddc _cAR