000			01291nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c513380 _d513380
008			200213b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBertelli, Anthony M. _916141
245			_aSetting the regulatory agenda: Statutory deadlines, delay and responsiveness
260			_bPublic Administration Review
300			_a79(5), Sep/Oct, 2019: p.710-720.
520			_aCongress imposes statutory deadlines in an attempt to influence agency regulatory agendas, but agencies regularly fail to meet them. What explains agency responsiveness to statutory deadlines? Taking a transaction cost politics approach, the authors develop a theory of responsiveness to deadlines centered on political feasibility to explain how agency managers map rulemaking onto calendar and political time. This theory is tested on all unique rules with statutory deadlines published in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions between 1995 and 2012. The argument and findings about the timing and ultimate promulgation of rules have implications that reorient the study of the regulatory agenda from legal and political into more managerial terms. - Reproduced.
700			_aDoherty, Kathleen M. _916142
773			_aPublic Administration Review
906			_aRegulation
942			_2ddc _cAR