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100			_aWhiteley, Paul _916563
245			_aHow do different sources of partisanship influence government accountability in Europe?
260			_bInternational Political Science Review
300			_a40(4), Sep, 2019: p.502-517.
520			_aThe possibility of holding representatives to account through regular elections is one of the cornerstones of representative democracy. The precise role of partisanship in doing this has not been extensively examined. Using survey data from Europe (2002–2012), we show that partisanship can weaken or strengthen accountability, depending on its sources. If it is an affective-psychological attitude, as the Michigan school suggests, then it weakens accountability because it acts as a perceptual screen. If, however, it is a calculation of party performance which is constantly updated by citizens, then it strengthens accountability. The findings suggest that partisanship in Europe has been quite responsive to performance over the ten-year period. Instead of acting as a screen that inhibits accountability, partisanship appears rooted in calculations of party performance and so enhances accountability. However, the effects are asymmetric with left-leaning partisans more sensitive to the performance of their governments than right-leaning partisans. - Reproduced.
650			_aGovernance _916564
650			_aAccountability - Europe _916565
700			_aKolln, Ann-Kristin _916566
773			_aInternational Political Science Review
906			_aAccountability
942			_2ddc _cAR