000			01271nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c513643 _d513643
008			200317b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aFeng, Josh _918423
245			_aCrafting intellectual property rights: Implications for patent assertion entities, litigation and innovation
260			_bAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
300			_a12(1), Jan, 2020: p.140-181.
520			_aWe show that examiner-driven variation in patent rights leads to quantitatively large impacts on several patent outcomes, including patent value, citations, and litigation. Notably, Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) overwhelmingly purchase patents granted by "lenient" examiners. These examiners issue patents that are more likely to be litigated by both PAEs and conventional companies, and that also have higher invalidity rates. PAEs leverage a specific friction in the patent system that stems from lenient examiners and affects litigation more broadly. These patterns indicate that there is much at stake during patent examination, contradicting the influential "rational ignorance" view of the patent office.
700			_aJaravel, Xavier _916872
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
906			_aIntellectual property
942			_2ddc _cAR