000			01261nam a2200145 4500
999			_c513689 _d513689
008			200331b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBriggs, Ryan C. _918782
245			_aReceiving foreign aid can reduce support for incumbent Presidents
260			_bPolitical Research Quarterly
300			_a72(3), Sep, 2019: p.610-622.
520			_aForeign aid is thought to be useful, and therefore desirable, to recipient governments because it allows them to increase their support through the provision of goods or services. However, the effect of the provision of aid on vote choice has rarely been directly tested. I examine the effect of receiving foreign aid on incumbent electoral support in three African countries using a spatial difference in differences design. Surprisingly, receiving aid lowers support for incumbent presidents. I test two mechanisms that could produce this result and find support for a mechanism where aid reduces one’s opinion of the incumbent, perhaps because aid does not live up to expectations. I discuss the implications of this result for research on the political effects of foreign aid and electoral accountability. - Reproduced.
773			_aPolitical Research Quarterly
906			_aFOREIGN AID
942			_2ddc _cAR