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999			_c513691 _d513691
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100			_aHopkins, Vincent _918783
245			_aThe influence of cause and sectional group lobbying on government responsiveness
260			_bPolitical Research Quarterly
300			_a72(3), Sep, 2019: p.623-636.
520			_aVoters are increasingly concerned that special interests control the policy process. Yet, the literature on representation is more optimistic: elected officials face strong incentives to listen to voters—not just lobby groups—and this makes for more responsive policies. Building on recent work, we argue a more nuanced point: different types of groups have different effects on responsiveness. We show empirically that lobbying from “cause” groups—representing diffuse interests like climate change—strengthens responsiveness, while lobbying from “sectional” groups—representing industry and professional associations—has no observable effect. Our project uses a novel data set of Canadian lobbying registrations spanning fifteen policy areas from 1990 to 2009. Using a dynamic panel model, we test how interest group lobbying moderates the effect of voter issue attention on government spending. Our findings contribute to contemporary debates over the influence of organized groups, suggesting some interest groups may improve representation. - Reproduced.
650			_aVoters, Elections _918784
700			_aKluver, Heike _916974
773			_aPolitical Research Quarterly
906			_aELECTORAL PROCESS
942			_2ddc _cAR