000			01205nam a22002057a 4500
999			_c513812 _d513812
008			200903b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBerg, Gerard J van den _917492
245			_aEvaluating vacancy referrals and the roles of sanctions and sickness absence
260			_aThe Economic Journal
300			_a129(624), Nov 2019. p. 3292–3322
520			_aJob vacancy referrals are a common active labour market policy measure. Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. During sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behaviour do not apply. This may reduce the threat effect of sanctions. We study effects of vacancy referrals and sanctions on unemployment duration and job match quality. We find that a vacancy referral increases the transition rate into work. We also find a positive effect of a vacancy referral on the probability of reporting sick.
650			_aLabour market _917487
650			_aSickness Absence _917488
650			_aUnemployment _917489
700			_aHofmann, Barbara _917490
700			_aUhlendorff, Arne _917491
773			_aThe Economic Journal
906			_aEMPLOYMENT
942			_cAR