000			01278nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c513817 _d513817
008			200903b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHerrera, Helios _917512
245			_aThe marginal voter's curse
260			_aThe Economic Journal
300			_a129(624), Nov 2019. p. 3137–3153
520			_aThe swing voter’s curse is useful for explaining patterns of voter participation, but arises because voters restrict attention to the rare event of a pivotal vote. Recent empirical evidence suggests that electoral margins influence policy outcomes, even away from the 50% threshold. If so, voters should also pay attention to the marginal impact of a vote. Adopting this assumption, we find that a marginal voter’s curse gives voters a new reason to abstain: to avoid diluting the pool of information. The two curses have similar origins and exhibit similar patterns, but the marginal voter’s curse is both stronger and more robust. In fact, the swing voter’s curse turns out to be on a knife edge: in large elections, a model with both pivotal and marginal considerations and a model with marginal considerations alone generate identical equilibrium behaviour.
650			_aVoters _917513
773			_aThe Economic Journal
906			_aELECTIONS
942			_cAR