000			01437nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514161 _d514161
008			201012b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aAgarwal, Sumit, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David and Douglas D. Evanoff _918533
245			_aFinancial education versus costly counseling: how to dissuade borrowers from choosing risky mortgages?
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policy
300			_a12(1), Feb, 2020: p. 1-32
520			_aThis paper explores the effects of mandatory third-party review of mortgage contracts on consumer choice. The study is based on a legislative pilot carried out in Illinois in 2006, under which mortgage counseling was triggered by applicant credit scores or by their choice of "risky mortgages." Low-credit score applicants for whom counselor review was mandatory did not materially alter their contract choice. Conversely, higher credit score applicants who could avoid counseling by choosing nonrisky mortgages did so, decreasing their propensity for high-risk contracts between 10 and 40 percent. In the event, one of the key goals of the legislation—curtailment of high-risk mortgage products—was only achieved among the population that was not counseled. - Reproduced
650			_aHousehold Saving, Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages _918522
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policy
906			_aPERSONAL FINANCE
942			_cAR