000			01294nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514208 _d514208
008			201014b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHalac, Marina, Ilan, Kremer, and Winter, Eyal _918652
245			_aRaising capital from heterogeneous investors
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a110(3), Mar, 2020: p.889-921
520			_aA firm raises capital from multiple investors to fund a project. The project succeeds only if the capital raised exceeds a stochastic threshold, and the firm offers payments contingent on success. We study the firm's optimal unique-implementation scheme, namely the scheme that guarantees the firm the maximum payoff. This scheme treats investors differently based on size. We show that if the distribution of the investment threshold is log-concave, larger investors receive higher net returns than smaller investors. Moreover, higher dispersion in investor size increases the firm's payoff. Our analysis highlights strategic risk as an important potential driver of inequality. – Reproduced
650			_aInvestment banking, Venture capital, Brokerage, Ratings and ratings agencies, Capital and ownership structure, Value of firms, Goodwill _918620
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aFIRM BEHAVIOR
942			_cAR