000			01371nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514213 _d514213
008			201014b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aDaley, Brendan and Green, Brett _918655
245			_aBargaining and news
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a110(2), Feb, 2020: p.428-474
520			_aWe study a bargaining model in which a buyer makes frequent offers to a privately informed seller, while gradually learning about the seller's type from "news." We show that the buyer's ability to leverage this information to extract more surplus from the seller is remarkably limited. In fact, the buyer gains nothing from the ability to negotiate a better price despite the fact that a negotiation must take place in equilibrium. During the negotiation, the buyer engages in a form of costly "experimentation" by making offers that are sure to earn her negative payoffs if accepted, but speed up learning and improve her continuation payoff if rejected. We investigate the effects of market power by comparing our results to a setting with competitive buyers. Both efficiency and the seller's payoff can decrease by introducing competition among buyers. – Reproduced
650			_aMatching Theory, Information and Knowledge, Communication _918630
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aBARGAINING THEORY
942			_cAR