000			01244nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514215 _d514215
008			201014b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHuo, Zhen and Pedroni, Marcelo _918657
245			_aA single-judge solution to beauty contests
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a110(2), Feb, 2020: p.526-568
520			_aWe show that the equilibrium policy rule in beauty contest models is equivalent to that of a single agent's forecast of the economic fundamental. This forecast is conditional on a modified information process, which simply discounts the precision of idiosyncratic shocks by the degree of strategic complementarity. The result holds for any linear Gaussian signal process (static or persistent, stationary or nonstationary, exogenous or endogenous), and also extends to network games. Theoretically, this result provides a sharp characterization of the equilibrium and its properties under dynamic information. Practically, it provides a straightforward method to solve models with complicated information structures.- Reproduce
650			_aThe general theory of employment, interest, and money _918634
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aNONCOOPERATIVE GAMES
942			_cAR