000			01113nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c514216 _d514216
008			201014b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aIchihashi, Shota _918659
245			_aOnline privacy and Information disclosure by consumers
260			_aThe American Economic Review
300			_a110(2), Feb, 2020: p.569-595
520			_aI study the welfare and price implications of consumer privacy. A consumer discloses information to a multiproduct seller, which learns about his preferences, sets prices, and makes product recommendations. Although the consumer benefits from accurate recommendations, the seller may use the information to price discriminate. I show that the seller prefers to commit to not use information for pricing in order to encourage information disclosure. However, this commitment hurts the consumer, who could be better off by precommitting to withhold some information. In contrast to single-product models, total surplus may be lower if the seller can base prices on information.- Reproduce
773			_aThe American Economic Review
906			_aCONSUMERS
942			_cAR