000			01254nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514241 _d514241
008			201020b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aVeit, Walter _918749
245			_aModel pluralism
260			_aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences
300			_a50(1), Mar, 2020: p.91-114
520			_aThis paper introduces and defends an account of model-based science that I dub model pluralism. I argue that despite a growing awareness in the philosophy of science literature of the multiplicity, diversity, and richness of models and modeling-practices, more radical conclusions follow from this recognition than have previously been inferred. Going against the tendency within the literature to generalize from single models, I explicate and defend the following two core theses: (i) any successful analysis of models must target sets of models, their multiplicity of functions within science, and their scientific context and history and (ii) for almost any aspect x of phenomenon y, scientists require multiple models to achieve scientific goal z. - Reproduced
650			_aModelling, Models, Model-based science, Pluralism, Idealization, Methodology _918746
773			_aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences
906			_aPLURALISM
942			_cAR