000			01295nam a22001577a 4500
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100			_aFraenkel, Jon. _920472
245			_a'Uncle Tom’ dilemma: Minorities in power-sharing arrangements
260			_aInternational Political Science Review
300			_a41(1), Jan, 2020: p.124-137
520			_aMandatory power-sharing laws aim to balance power between groups in contexts where majoritarian democracy might disadvantage minorities. Yet, unless veto arrangements are in place, cabinet-level decision-making usually continues to operate under majority rule. Minority parties participating in such power-sharing executives may lose support in their own communities owing to a failure to deliver substantial reforms or to advance minority objectives and become seen as ‘Uncle Tom’ type figures who no longer represent their own community. This article explores examples of these dilemmas facing power-sharing cabinets in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Fiji, and the French Pacific territory of New Caledonia.- Reproduced
650			_aPower-sharing, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Fiji, New Caledonia _918942
773			_aInternational Political Science Review
906			_aDEMOCRACY
942			_cAR