000			01562nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514352 _d514352
008			201027b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aShin, Mi Jeong. _920483
245			_aWhy do countries change the taxation of foreign-source income of multinational firms?
260			_aInternational Political Science Review
300			_a41(2), Mar, 2020: p.287-302
520			_aWhy do some countries continue to tax income that multinational firms create overseas, even as other countries increasingly adopt a system that only taxes income generated within the country? I argue that this phenomenon reflects an interaction between trade openness and the number of veto players. Increasing trade openness incentivizes governments to move to a territorial tax system, because firms that operate across borders want to avoid various tax liabilities in multiple countries. Yet countries with fewer veto players are more likely to move to a territorial tax system than those with many veto players. To test my hypothesis, I employ survival and logistic regression analyses of 15 advanced industrialized countries between 1981 and 2013. Overall the findings conform to the expectation: Economically open countries with fewer veto players are more likely to shift to a territorial tax system than those with many veto players. – Reproduced
650			_aTerritorial taxation, Worldwide taxation, Foreign-Source income of multinationals, Trade openness, Veto players _918960
773			_aInternational Political Science Review
906			_aTAXATION
942			_cAR