000			01119nam a22001457a 4500
999			_c514423 _d514423
008			201031b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aWaldman, Michael and Zax, Ori. _920707
245			_aPromotion signaling and human capital investments
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a12(1), Feb, 2020: p.125-155
520			_aIn a world characterized by asymmetric learning, promotions can serve as signals of worker ability, and this, in turn, can result in inefficient promotion decisions. If the labor market is competitive, the result will be practices that reduce this distortion. We explore how this logic affects human capital investment decisions. We show that, if commitment is possible, investments will be biased toward the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. We also consider what happens when commitment is not possible and show a number of results including that, if investment choices are not publicly observable, choices are frequently efficient.- Reproduced
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aHUMAN CAPITAL
942			_cAR