000			01185nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514427 _d514427
008			201102b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHalac, Marina and Kremer, Ltan _920738
245			_aExperimenting with career concerns
260			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
300			_a12(1), Feb, 2020: p.260-288
520			_aA manager who learns privately about a project over time may want to delay quitting it if recognizing failure/lack of success hurts his reputation. In the banking industry, managers may want to roll over bad loans. How do distortions depend on expected project quality? What are the effects of releasing public information about quality? A key feature of banks is that managers learn about project quality from bad news, i.e., a default. We show that in such an environment, distortions tend to increase with expected quality and imperfect information about quality. Results differ if managers instead learn from good news.- Reproduced
650			_aBanks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages _920739
773			_aAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
906			_aBANKING AND FINANCE
942			_cAR