000			01147nam a22001577a 4500
999			_c514429 _d514429
008			201102b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLipnowski, Elliot and Dong Wei _920729
245			_aAttention Management
260			_aThe American Economic Review: Insights
300			_a2(1), Mar, 2020: p.17-32
520			_aAttention costs can cause some information to be ignored and decisions to be imperfect. Can we improve the material welfare of a rationally inattentive agent by restricting his information in the first place? In our model, a well-intentioned principal provides information to an agent for whom information is costly to process, but the principal does not internalize this cost. We show that full information is universally optimal if and only if the environment comprises one issue. With multiple issues, attention management becomes optimal: the principal restricts some information to induce the agent to pay attention to other aspects.- Reproduced
650			_aAsymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design _920730
773			_aThe American Economic Review: Insights
906			_aDECISION MAKING
942			_cAR